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Electric utilities are urged to increase both the thermal efficiency of their 
existing plants, and the substitution of renewable energy resources for fossil 
fuel in electricity production. In the meantime, they must manage to stabilise 
future costs by reducing the dependence vis-à-vis oil and gas, the prices of 
which have shown sharp fluctuations since year 2000. As it is progressively 
deregulated, the internal energy market is characterised by tremendous 
institutional changes that have been shaping the industrial structure of the 
electricity industry. There is now clear evidence that more market forms of 
mechanisms used between the unbundled system operators, generators and 
retailers for decision making (governance) have significantly influenced the 
R&D policy of electric utilities in developed economies. Markard et al. 
(2004) showed for a sample of several European countries (Germany, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands) that liberalisation induced changes in the 
selection of innovations by electric utilities produced by equipment builders 
and themselves. In addition, increased liberalisation of the European 
electricity industry has created new opportunities for further 
internationalisation of already big electric utilities, with the consequence that 
some electric utilities decided to increase their debts to extend their scope of 
activities abroad through acquisitions rather than to fund R&D projects. This 
restructuring gives birth to a more concentrated European oligopoly of 
electric utilities fringed by smaller entrants, which raises the question 
whether large firms would have an advantage to achieve the aforementioned 
objectives.
2 The bottom line is that the EU may not meet its ambitious 
environmental goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% by 
2020 (Commission of the European Communities, 2007), for it may not have 
created a sufficiently stable environment that is yet necessary for promoting 
renewable energy resources.  
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This cahater studies the determinants of R&D expenditures. To understand 
the drivers of R&D in the case of the European electricity industry, I follow 
previous authors and focus on an input albeit imperfect measure of 
innovation in the electricity industry, namely research and development 
expenditures (hereafter, R&D). Figure 1 shows the evolution of total R&D 
expenditures over the period 1980 through to 2007 for a sample of nineteen 













































Figure  1  Total R&D expenditures for European electric utilities, 1980–
2007 
 
We observe a striking similarity with the trend reversion reported in Sanyal 
and Cohen (2008) and Sanyal (2007) in the case of U.S. firms, yet the 
reversion period occurs later for European firms. In the U.S.A., the maximum 
national value is achieved about 1993, whereas here the peak is in 2000. This 
dramatic decline was reported for both total R&D (Sanyal and Cohen, 2008) 
and environmental R&D (Sanyal, 2007) expenses by electric utilities.  
Which factors stand behind this decline? The determinants of R&D within 
the electricity industry in Europe drew the attention of economists following 
its decline from the early 1980s in the U.S.A. and the U.K. The main reasons 
advocated by several authors are the higher competition expected from the 
deregulation of the utilities which increases uncertainty in the value of future 
revenues (Sanyal and Cohen, 2008; Sanyal, 2007; Margolis and Kammen,  
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1999). Hence deregulation would act as a disincentive to undertake research 
activities. A further reason in the U.S.A. was an overall reduction in federal 
and state funding, more particularly in nuclear, fossiel fuels and biological 
and environmental R&D (see GAO, 1996, p. 5). Interestingly, this literature 
suggests it is not deregulation per se that matters but its expected 
consequences. Sanyal argues that utilities anticipating further deregulation 
may have cut back on environmental research following the first sign of 
change. Therefore, actual restructuring, when it happens, would have little 
impact.
3 More recently, Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) reach the same conclusion 
on the role of markets liberalisation in explaining the decline in R&D efforts 
in several European countries. Sanyal (2007, p. 337) suggests that increased 
competition will lead electric utilities to cut back on R&D, in particular when 
R&D spending are more directed towards social goals and ‘public-interest’ 
(e.g. research on global warming), because such research does not confer 
short-term cost reduction or efficiency enhancement that would bring private 
benefits to electric utilities. This negative influence on R&D of expected 
competitive pressures is reinforced by the public good nature of innovation in 
electricity due to the negative external effects characterising most 
environmental problems (Horbach, 2008, p. 165). This tends to limit the 
scope of private involvement as spillovers reduce the returns from R&D 
expenditure to private investors (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008, p. 998). 
The purpose of the present article is to provide applied evidence of the 
combined effect of size and reforms on innovative activity by electric 
utilities, through a test of the ‘Schumpetarian hypothesis’, for a sample of 
twenty European electric utilities with annual observations for the period 
1980 to 2007. To our knowledge a pioneer contribution analysing the effect 
on R&D of size across a panel of electric utilities is the seminal paper of 
Wilder and Stansell (1974). Their main results, which are stable over the 
period 1968 through to 1970, are that R&D intensity increases with firm size 
and that electric utilities perform more R&D associated with electric 
operations than with other operations. This led them to the conclusion that 
‘…increasing [electric utility] size, either through a merger or internal 
growth, would have a favourable effect on R&D outlays.’ Since the earliest 
work of Wilder and Stansell (1974), there is a limited number of econometric 
studies on this general issue as noticed by Jamasb and Pollitt (2008; see also 
references therein). Sanyal (2007) and Sanyal and Cohen (2008) are the most 
recently published works on this issue in the case U.S. electric utilities. From 
their and a couple of previous econometric studie, the elasticity of R&D 
spending with respect to size lies in the interval 0.84–1.61 with an everage 
value of 1.24.  
These results suggest a positive concentration effect on R&D. Quoting 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2008, p. 9999), ‘[s]ince vertical unbundling and  
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horizontal splitting of utilities reduce the size of utilities significantly, these 
results imply that following restructuring, large reductions in utility R&D 
spending are possible.’ 
A statement of the advantage of large firms is given in Cohen and Klepper 
(1996) and is referred to as ‘the R&D cost spreading advantage’ (hereafter 
we shall refer indifferently to their model or to the cost spreading advantage 
by using the abbreviation ‘CSA’) thereby the larger the firm then the greater 
the level of output over which it can apply the fruits and average the costs of 
its R&D. Apart from Jamasb and Pollitt (2008, p. 999)’s assertion that ‘[i]t is 
conceivable that large utilities were better positioned to benefit from the scale 
factor that new technologies offered’, what we know about the relevance of 
the CSA in the case of European electric utilities is still opened to question.
4  
The main contribution of the present paper is to test a ‘weak version’ of 
this hypothesis in the case of European electric utilities. We shall not only 
analyse the determinants of R&D, with size as the primary variable of 
interest, but also the effect of factors likely to be responsible for the decrease 
in aggregated R&D efforts. Next section describes the theoretical framework 
underlying the CSA hypothesis suggested by Cohen and Klepper, and its 
relevance for application to electric utilities. We then present the data and the 
econometric model before estimating the relationship between firm R&D 
efforts and size conditional on other factors. Several hypotheses are tested in 
the present paper, of which two are classical in the literature on the 
economics of innovation. First, the Schumpeterian hypothesis thereby R&D 
intensity increases with firm size. The second and stronger hypothesis can be 
termed the ‘threshold size hypothesis’ (see Symeonidis, 1996; Bound et al., 
1984, p. 50). According to this latter hypothesis the amount of R&D 
expenditures is independent of or declines proportionally with size beyond a 
certain level of size. This latter test is motivated by the work of Wilder and 
Stansell (1974) who had not found such threshold size in a panel of more 
than 200 electric utilities in the late 1960s. These hypotheses can be tested 
through the theoretical framework of the CSA model applied to electric 
utilities. We also consider the role of firm’s characteristics including 
financial variables and the differential effects of some characteristics of the 
country to which they belong. Finally, we summarise the results and provide 





Cohen and Klepper (1996) provided a theoretical and directly estimable 
model of the close relationship often estimated between firm R&D effort and 
firm size at the business unit level, that is to say at the level of a firm’s  
 
5
activity within a given product market. One consequence of the CSA 
hypothesis is that R&D efforts should rise proportionally with size at the 
business unit level. The simple version of the CSA model relies on two 
assumptions/conditions (our working assumptions): 
 
• The firm exploits almost all its innovation through its own output; 
• The firm does not innovate to grow rapidly (at the time of innovation). 
 
In a nutshell, R&D would rise more than proportionally to sales in larger 
firms as they have more incentive to exploit their innovations chiefly through 
their own output and to do so at the time they conduct R&D. This implies 
that due to cost spreading, the consolidation of two or more firms can lead 
them to undertake R&D projects that were not previously profitable, thereby 
increasing the industry’s rate of innovation (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, p. 
947). 
The second condition means that the firm expects that its innovation will 
diffuse among its current level of output or a closely related value of it. This 
is what Cohen and Klepper term as ‘ex-ante output’ or the output at the time 
the firm conducts R&D. The higher this output, then the greater the firm 
incentive to conduct R&D. The CSA also predicts that returns to R&D 
should depend more on firms size than if the firm could sell their innovation 
in disembodied form due to product innovation (Cohen and Klepper, p. 927): 
‘… if firms could reap the full rents from their innovation via licensing, there 
would be no [CSA] of large size and (ex ante) firm size would not condition 
the returns to R&D.’ (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, p. 947). These assumptions 
are the roots of the ‘strong form’ of the CSA hypothesis. As we work at the 
corporate level, we must focus on the prediction of the CSA model for this 
level of aggregation, which we call the ‘weak form’ of the CSA hypothesis. 
As noted by the authors, the prospect of appropriating a fraction of the 
returns of innovation obviously depend, among other things on patents 
application and the market structure, this latter being related to firm size. 
 
The CSA Model and Electric Utilities 
 
Testing the CSA is particularly difficult however, given the evolution of 
aggregated R&D efforts shown in Figure 1. Moreover, as suggested 
previously paragraph, changes in the market structure are likely to have 
influenced the appropriation of returns to innovation, an issue not explicitly 
modelled by Cohen and Klepper. More crucial, data limitation does not 
permit us to consider R&D at the level of business units. Therefore, if we 
find a close and positive (possibly more than proportional) relationship 
between R&D and size at the corporate level may not be evidence of the  
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validity of the CSA hypothesis at the business unit level. Still, we believe the 
assumptions underlying their model are relevant for our understanding of the 
behaviour of electric utilities with respect to R&D effort, however. 
By the CSA hypothesis, if there is a close relationship between R&D and 
size observed at the corporate level, it reflects an aggregation of such 
relationships at the business unit level. Other correlates of overall firm size 
can also account for that relationship at the corporate level (see Cohen and 
Klepper, 1996, p. 935–36; Symeonidis, 1996, p. 16). To mention a few, 
corporations have greater: 
 
• Willingness to incur the risks associated with R&D (risk pooling); 
• Access to finance (liquidity); 
• Ability to internalise R&D spillovers due to greater diversification 
(scope economies); 
• Likelihood to possess the complementary capabilities (e.g. marketing) 
necessary to exploit innovations. 
 
Beyond the aforementioned correlates, the relationship between R&D and 
size should be strong in electricity for several reasons. First of all electricity 
research is very specific to the electric industry, with little scope for 
redeployment. Therefore, electric utilities have more incentives than firms 
from other industries to incorporate their process innovation in their own 
output.  
Moreover, several incentives must have induced electric utilities to 
exploiting their innovation mainly through their own output rather than by 
selling them in disembodied form to competitors.
5 A first incentive is related 
to the high degree of concentration that we observe in the electricity industry. 
Over most of the period covered by our data several electric utilities were 
vertically integrated from generation to retail. Some were regional or national 
incumbents (a single or a few firms were enfranchised and deemed natural 
monopolies). Therefore, as incumbents they used to have a sort of pre-
emption right on the use of innovations provided by domestic equipment 
builders. They feared less imitation from competitors, gained more scale 
economies associated with innovations (Horbach, 2008, p. 165) and the 
possibility of replication was restricted to the regional monopoly area of each 
utility. Second, for a homogenous good like electricity, the number of 
product markets is small (the good is essentially differentiated over time). 
This nature of electricity implies that electric utilities used to increase their 
margins in particular by reducing costs through process R&D.
6 The CSA 
model encompasses process R&D (see Cohen and Klepper, paragraph 2, p. 
931) whose principal purpose is to lower the average cost of production of 
the firm’s entire output. Unlike product R&D, process R&D should have as  
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consequence that ‘… the expected returns to process innovation will be 
conditioned to some degree by the firm’s ex ante output.’ (Cohen and 
Klepper, 1996, p. 943).
7 The third incentive is an assumption at the heart of 
Cohen and Klepper’s model thereby firms that have a CSA are granted with 
some market power over their products, which allows them to increase their 
margin once process innovation has reduced their cost of production. This is 
an appropriate assumption for electric utilities, the consumers of which have 
very high costs to switch them (see Salies 2008 and the references therein). 
Customers generally have high switching costs even several years after retails 
markets are opened up to competition, which makes incumbents willing to 
incur the risks associated with sunk R&D outlays. Electricité de France 
(hereafter, EdF) is a case in point given its position as ex-incumbent 
electricity retailer to almost 29 millions residential consumers. A fourth 
reason is that the incentive to increase margins by reducing costs is 
reinforced by the fact that retail electricity rates are heavily regulated 
(although to a lesser extent since the wave of electricity markets 
liberalisation). To put is briefly, rate regulation ensured some revenue to the 
firm, but induced it to raise margins through cost reduction. For example, in 
the case of the U.K., Littlechild (1998) clearly showed indeed the effect of 
price cap regulation such regulation in distribution businesses turnover and 
operating income: a tighter price control implies lower revenues. 
 
The Formal Model 
 
In the CSA model firms differ with respect to their R&D expenditures  ict R  
(  in country   at year  =1,..., iN C T 1, , c = K 1, , t = K ). Given sales and other 
variables, all firms  face the same price-cost margin schedule   given by 




11 1 / (1 1/ ) ( 1) ct ict OR
β β
−− − −  (1) 
 
where  ,  0 ict R > 1 β ≥  and  ct O  represents an index of industry technological 
opportunities, which affects firms of in country c  equally and is allowed to 
vary over time. Therefore  ict  is an increasing but concave function of  ict M R  
(process R&D in power plants diminishes production cost, regardless the 
level of consumer prices. The derivative of  ict  with respect to  ict M R  is what 
Cohen and Klepper (1996, p. 932) term as the marginal return from R&D (or 
marginal R&D productivity schedule). Firms are assumed to differ with 
respect to the productivity of their R&D efforts (as M  is increasing in  R , 
there is an advantage of being large as an innovator). When 1/β  approaches 
1, the l’Hôpital’s rule leads to the margin schedule given in Cohen and 
Klepper (1996):   and the marginal R&D productivity  ln( ) ict ct ict MO R → 
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schedule is equal to  / ct ict OR . When 1/ 1 β <  then the marginal R&D 
productivity schedule falls less rapidly than  / ct ict OR . This is exactly the 
situation where R&D will rise more than proportionally with firm size, which 
will be reinforced in firms benefiting from higher O . Our CSA model is 
slightly more general than that of Cohen and Klepper (1996) in the sense that 
we explicited the price-cost margin functional in the case 11 / β ≠ . There is 
also a difference with respect to Cohen and Klepper (1996)’s model in that in 
their paper,   is a fixed parameter. Here, O  are country-specific to capture 
the influence of scientific capacity and the general propensity of countries to 
patent over time, in a single industry, namely electricity. 
O
Let us denote   the level of output at the time the firm conducts its 
R&D. Cohen and Klepper assume firms earn rents from their R&D for one 
period that is the length of time before R&D is imitated, which they formalise 
as   that is the fraction of output embodying the firm’s innovation. 
Besides, since innovation does not influence current output they relate the 




1 ict Q −  is substituted for   
in the theoretical model. Firm i  chooses 
ict Q
ict R  to privately maximise profits 
, which we denote by  1 () ict ict i ict ict MRN g Q R F − −− ict Π  subject to the 
constraint that   is non-negative.  ict Π i N  denotes the productivity level of 
firm  ’s R&D and   denotes a fixed cost required to carry out R&D 
programs. On introducing 
i F
i N , the authors allow smaller firms to 
  have greater R&D productivity to cover  , which accommodates 
departure from proportionality. Substituting (1) into 
F
ict Π  then maximising, 




1 () i f
0i f  0





− ⎧  0
β Π ≥ ⎪ = ⎨




Note that Eq. (2) which relates R&D expenditures of one firm only to its own 
output, its technical opportunities and returns to R&D implies electric 
utilities make ‘independent R&D decisions’. The possibility that firms 
acquire another innovative one involved in complementary R&D activities is, 
perhaps, an argument against the independence assumption. I will look at the 
correlation structure of our model to test for the independence between all 





Data on R&D and other variables of company’s accounts listed below are 
from Thomson Financial (Datastream). We collected data on 22 major  
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floated electric utilities operating mainly in Europe for the year 1980 through 
to 2007. We discarded equipment builders such as Areva and Alstom 
(France) or Siemens (Germany). This is left for future research (see our 
conclusion section). When several firms merged, we only consider the 
merged entity. Apart from Electrabel the acquisition of which by Suez is 
recent, affiliates are not considered as separate individuals in our sample. 
Furthermore, we focus on those particular firms that achieve a ratio of at least 
50% of their sales in electricity in the year 2004 (see footnote 1 of Table 1). 
We therefore discarded British Gas, Gaz de France and Suez to avoid the 
consequence on our statistical results of heterogeneity across firms due to the 
presence of multi-utilities. Note this does not imply that the fraction of R&D 
expenditures devoted to electricity is at least 50%. Wilder and Stansell (1974) 
follow a similar approach to differentiate electric utility operations from other 
types of utility activities.
9 In their model, the ratio of electric to total 
operating revenue is inserted in the set of right-hand side variables. They 
avoided criticism of the lack of such ratio for R&D by presuming that 
revenues derived from activities such as gas distribution involve static 
technologies. In the present paper we were unable to find that ratio for all 
years of observation due to data limitation. Furthermore, this fraction has 
certainly changed over time as a result of acquisition of other firms. 
Our panel is unbalanced for several obvious reasons. For example, some 
firms can be traced back longer than others. More crucial, there are missing 
values for the R&D variable with a few firms that never report R&D 
expenditures. For example, Iberdrola has missing R&D values from 1981 to 
1990. We do not know whether this latter type of incompleteness is due to 
randomly missing observations. We are in the ‘ignorable selection rule’ as 
described in Baltagi (2005 p. 220). One obvious reason might be that certain 
firms refuse to report R&D, which should be controlled for. Another reason 
could be that according to their accounting standard some countries give 
firms the possibility to capitalise their R&D expenses, under certain 
conditions however (over most of the period covered in the present analysis, 




A brief discussion of innovation in the electricity sector shall be given in the 
following paragraphs,
10 with our choice of potential determinants of R&D in 
our sample of European electric utilities.  
 
Electric utilities R&D 
Our input innovation variable is total electric utilities R&D (their 
subsidiaries’ R&D inclusive). It represents all direct and indirect costs  
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related to the creation and development of new processes, techniques, 
applications and products with commercial possibilities. These costs can be 
categorized as basic research and applied research.
11 Electric utilities do not 
dedicate large sums to R&D (three out of our 22 utilities have no R&D 
expenditure and one firm reports only one value). They spend about 2% of 
their sales in R&D in the most favourable years (EdF, Edison, Enel, E.ON, 
International Power, RWE, Verbund), compared with equipment builders 
such as Areva (About 3.5%) and Vestas (2%). Compared to manufacturing 
firms in other industries (drugs and medical instruments, information and 
communication technologies, aircraft and aerospace), these figures are not 
big, neither for equipment manufacturers. A possible reason is that as we do 
not consider capitalised R&D expenses that are included in intangible assets 
(this is left for future researches), we may miss a significant fraction of 
realised R&D. More important, according to Deufeilley and Furtado (2000), 
the problem of electric utilities is that of adopting the right innovative 
technology, in particular in generation, than creating those technologies, 
which remains the role of equipment builders. As a consequence electric 
utilities dedicate fewer funds to researches that are more specific to 
equipment builders. This was conjectured by GAO (1996, p. 9) that 
suggested that electric equipment manufacturers may take on the 
development of new products. 
The electricity industry as a whole favours the development of incremental 
technologies aimed at improving energy efficiency of existing plants from 
existing ones (small hydro plants, clean coal plants), notably in responses to 
movements in the price of energy resources (Defeuilley and Furtado, 2000, 
pp. 2–4). As amphasised by Jamasb and Pollitt (2008, p. 1005), ‘[g]iven the 
slow rate of growth in demand for electricity, it is less likely that utilities will 
engage in long-term and path breaking research’. As an example, researches 
on clean coal technologies (e.g. Topping Cycle technology in England and 
Wales) were neglected in favour of combined cycle-thermal gas plants during 
the period known as ‘dash-for gas’. We notice political influence was a 
powerful driver for major innovations like the introduction of nuclear power 
(Markard et al., 2004, p. 210). Let us note that organisational innovations as 
well resulted from market liberalisation (Markard et al., 2004). Many electric 
utilities have for example undergone a phase of organisational restructuring, 
which includes the spin off of research units. As an example EdF Energies 
Nouvelles, 100% subsidiary of EdF corporation. As suggested in Markard et 
al. (2004), on founding subsidiaries to pursue a very progressive innovation 
strategy, the parent company can avoid frictions with the established 
business. 
R&D in electricity can be split between environmental and non-
environmental projects. We point out this distinction because as regards to 
the U.S. experience, it is environmental R&D that decreased significantly 
following electricity markets deregulation. According to many utility R&D  
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managers in the U.S.A., their companies shifted the focus of their R&D away 
from long-term advanced-technology R&D to short-term projects that would 
provide a competitive edge in the near term (GAO, 1996, p. 11). This 
paragraph also gives us an opportunity to be more explicit about R&D 
activity by electric utilities. Environmental R&D covers the full range of 
upstream and downstream issues relating to electricity. It is the R&D directed 
towards public-interest projects such as research on global warming. 
Environmental innovation in particular consists of new or modified 
processes, techniques, systems and products to avoid or reduce 
environmental damage (see Horbach, 2008, p. 163 and the references therein 
which suggest that it is difficult to agree on a definition of ‘environmental 
innovation’). Long-term environmental researches are on micro-
cogeneration, fuel cell batteries, tidal turbine system, new solar energy 
technologies, and biomass gasification. They also include researches on the 
local impact of climate change, biodiversity and water quality through studies 
on storage of radioactive wastes. From a short run perspective its aim is to 
make more efficient uses of energy, improve or develop coal plants with 
carbon dioxide capture, plants fed with renewable energy resources and 
energy saving appliances oriented towards small and large consumers, 
dispatching, smart network management to allow better integration of 
centralized generation and distributed energy, improving the performance of 
heat pumps (high temperature), electric vehicles and hybrid vehicles in 
partnership with the automotive industry. 
Nonetheless, the distinction between environmental and non-
environmental R&D is not trivial. Companies like EdF consider researches 
on future generation reactors as belonging to the former type.
12 Altough 
several R&D and test facilities have been closed in the past decade in Europe 
(WEC, 2007, pp. 79–80), France and other countries of the EU maintain 
active researches in nuclear fission (e.g. fast neutron reactor) and fusion both 
to meet more demanding safety criteria and maintain the EU’s technological 
lead for a technology facing competition from the US and several far-Eastern 
countries.
13 In fact many big electric utilities conduct both types of 
researches. It is important to emphasise that unlike Sanyal (2007) who 
employs ‘environmental R&D’, we are unable to make that distinction over 
the period covered by our data (our sample spans 28 years).
14 Patents turn out 
to be more relevant a variable to overcome that problem (see the concluding 
section of the present paper). 
Table 1 shows that apart from four out of 18 firms (British Energy, 
Endesa, Iberdrola Vattenfall), R&D intensity decreased following the first 
piece of legislation. Iberdrola increased its expenditure in R&D per € of 
assets size three years before the Spanish act in 1994 and three years after. 
No R&D data was reported since 1997 inclusive. The 46% increase in R&D  
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intensity of British Energy must be considered with caution as this firm 
reported R&D for only a three year-period, 2005–2007. Similarly, the drop of 
–53% of Verbund corresponds to a short period, 1998–2001. The evolution 
of R&D intensity for firms like EdF and E.ON is typical of results found in 
the literature: the change in R&D intensity is positive or small and negative 
before the first piece of legislation then it decreases significantly after (nearly 
–10% for EdF and –25% for E.ON). To show the significance of these 
results, it is important to emphasise that following the national energy acts, 
firms associated with a decrease in R&D intensity have also reduced the level 
of their R&D expenditures. There is one exception, namely SSE. 
 
















Atel 100/100  2002  NV  NV 
British E.  100/100  1989  NV  46.58 
CEZ 100/92.6  2000  NV –17.44 
EdF 96/93  2000  29.48  –9.84 
Edison 95/70.5  1999  –7.81  –28.63 
EDP 95.5/90.7  1995  NV  NV 
Electrabel 91/73
4 1999  NV  0
5 
Endesa 98.6/95  1994  NV  27.89 
Enel 82/69  1999 1.30  –18.78 
E.ON 97.8/55  1998  –2.05 –24.47 
Iberdrola 95.7/92  1994  17.00  10.57 
Inter. Power  NA
3 1989  NV  –13.59 
MVV Energie  95/52
4 1998  NV  –12.38 
RWE 82.6/56  1998  –0.96  –19.78 
SSE 95/70  1989  NV –1.01 
U. Fenosa  86.4/80.9  1994  NV  NV 
Vattenfall 93.4/87.2  1995  NV  49.59 
Verbund 98.5/98.5  1998  NV  –53.08 
 
Note. 
1.  For some firms, the column includes the share of electricity in total sales in 2004 (Eurostaf, 
2005, p. 81). We consider firms whose the share of electricity in total sales or revenues is at 
least 50%. For firms not present in the 2005’s Eurostaf document, we checked directly in 
Datastream. The year is that previous merger operation. When Datastream reports that the 
firm operates in the ‘electricity sector’ but the share of electricity dales in total sales is not 
available we went to visit firms’ corporate website. We retain firms whose annual report in 
2007 explicitly mentions that most sales are derived from owning and operating power 
plants. 
2.  The date of liberalisation varies across countries, but is not reported here. 
3.  ‘NA’ stands for ‘Not Available’ but we know from the firm’s annual report that most firm’s 
sales are derived from owning and operating power plants corporate  
4.  Figures for Electrabel and MVV Energie are observed in 2005 and 2008, respectively. 
5.  ‘0’ means the firm reported one value for R&D. An empty cell means that there was no R&D 




The choice between sales and assets as a proxy of size is not obvious, more 
particularly in the energy sector. Wilder and Stansell (1974) and Sanyal and 
Cohen (2008) employ annual total utility operating revenues as the size 
variable whilst Dhrymes and Kurz (1964) used sales. As in Sanyal (2007) we 
use total assets. Del Monte and Papagni (2003) recommended using sales as a 
proxy for size, for it as has merit to avoid problems over capital valuation 
during periods of inflation, of revaluation. On the one hand, changes in the 
price of fossil fuels may be responsible of significant changes in sales 
through changes in the wholesale price of electricity. This may reinforce the 





A distinction between firms owning regulated networks and others is 
important as shown in Bourgade (2008) from a sample of firms operating in 
electricity. It is crucial to differentiate electric utilities with respect to 
network business owning, for price regulation of network activities provide 
vertically integrated utilities with highly predictable and recurrent cash-flows 
(Bourgade, 2008, p. 2): revenues from distribution are partially guaranteed as 
regulators control distribution prices which are typically set a year ahead. As 
a consequence the acquisition of distribution businesses can be more 
attractive than acquisition of generation assets since revenues from 
generation activities fluctuate with the intensity of competition and the 
volatility of price energy resources thus the less productive firms may 
experience some punctual losses when retail rates are caped low. Whereas 
supply activities will have to face lower profitability for firms exposed to 
CO2 prices and emission schemes (Bourgade, 2008), cash-flows related to 
network activities brings stable revenues which could be used to fund R&D 
projects. Furthermore, littlechild (1998, pp. 20, 24) showed evidence for 
Great Britain that operating profits in distribution was ten times higher than 
in retail. 
A dummy for the existence of network activities will be inserted. The 
expected influence of the ‘network’ dummy variable is ambiguous, however. 
Network activities are a source of predictable cash flows likely to finance 
innovation in vertically integrated utilities, certainly, but network businesses 
have less incentive to spend in environmental R&D than supply businesses. 
Sanyal (2007) does not consider electricity distributors as innovators 
compared to power producers and equipment builders. Unlike generators and 
retailers, network businesses do not contract directly with consumers thus 
have little scope to competing for consumers outside their local network. In 




The issue here is whether for those firms that acquired others, innovating 
activities are different. We remind the reader that we selected firms that have 
not been subject to acquisitions by others. Therefore, financial reports of all 
firms are available until 2007 that is the latest year in our sample. One 
exception is Electrabel, the financial report of which dropped in 2007. M&A 
operations is a favourable event to test for the Schumpeterian hypothesis as 
they have as systematic effect to increase the size and impact several 
variables of the balance sheet. They may therefore have a positive effect on 
internal R&D in regards to the CSA model as the output over which to spread 
the cost of R&D increases. M&A operations can also influence positively the 
amount spent in R&D, for merged entities find complementarities in research 
outputs that are favourable to each individually (technological transfer,…). 
They would increase their control over the diffusion and use of their 
innovation. On the other hand intense domestic and more particularly cross-
border mergers operations can have as effect to reduce the variety in 
innovative activities by electric utilities (Markard et al., 2004, p. 212). M&A 
operations can indeed be motivated by the acquisition of external technical 
knowledge, or firms would acquire others to substitute these latter’s R&D s 
skills for their own (Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 
1996, p. 193), so that M&A operations influence negatively the amount of 
R&D per unit of size.  
Sanyal and Cohen (2008, pp. 25, 46) controlled for pending mergers 
through a dummy that takes the value 1 from the time mergers are announced 
till the date they are consumed and found a negative influence on R&D. We 
choose a different approach. Given R&D reorganisation requires time, to test 
the hypothesis that mergers reduce duplication of R&D expenditures (the 
coefficient multiplying the M&A variable should be negative or zero), we 
follow Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) who used as a measure of M&A intensity 
the past cumulated number of M&A over a period of three years with a year 
lag to account for the delayed repercussion of industrial restructuring on 
R&D. The different kind of operations (full purchase, merger and increase in 
shareholding) are not distinguished. Thus a non-significant coefficient could 
reflect the aforementioned opposite influences.  
 
Financial policy 
Little is known about the link between electric utilities’ corporate financial 
policy and R&D funding in the economic literature. There are at least two 
reasons. Papers that address this issue did it for U.S. electric utilities and 
without going into details (Sanyal, 2007 and Guerard, 2005 who report the 
study on electric utilities of a famous 1958’s Modigliani and Miller paper; 
Wilder and Stansell, 1974). Other works on electric utilities’ finance did not  
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consider R&D (Blacconière et al., 2000; Dhrymes and Kurz, 1964). Recent 
acquisitions by European electric utilities however suggest these firms are 
willing to use a large portion of their financial resources for foreign 
investment, notably cross-boarder acquisitions and purchases of shares in 
companies’ stock. In fact, acquisitions can increase debt to such an extent 
that The Financial Times reported recently financial analysts were expecting 
EdF to be cash-flow negative at the operating level in 2009 and 2010 
(Hollinger, 2009). 
 
The financial policy of electric utilities. Wilder and Stansell (1974) and 
Sanyal (2007) considered a profitability variable among the determinants of 
R&D. The usual argument about the profitability-R&D link is if firm margins 
rise, then managers become more optimistic about their firms’ fate and raise 
R&D spending (Mahlich and Roediger-Schluga, 2006, p 154). Though, 
Wilder and Stansell found an inelastic response of R&D suggesting that an 
increase in the regulated rate of return would not be an effective way to 
increase utility R&D outlays. At the converse, Sanyal found a strong positive 
impact which she interpreted as electric utilities with more spare resources 
spend more in environmental R&D. These opposite results, notwithstanding 
they relate to different sample periods, do now allow us to predict the 
expected effect of profitability on R&D for European electric utilities. 
Related papers on the financial policy of electric utilities are that of 
Dhrymes and Kurz (1964) who considered the determinants of the dividend 
policy of electric utilities before the U.S. electricity industry was deregulated, 
and Blacconière et al. (2000) who considered the role of deregulation on the 
value relevance of earnings. Dhrymes and Kurz found that payout ratios were 
characterised by a considerable degree of inertia with significant differences 
across firms, however. They interpreted a significantly positive influence of 
sales on the payout ratio and on dividends per dollar of sales as evidence that 
small electric utilities tend to retain a higher portion of their profits (distribute 
less dividends) than the larger ones. From this and other results they 
suggested as an explanation that size is also an indication of ease of access to 
the capital market with smaller firms that are ‘compelled’ to finance a 
relatively larger portion of their investment program by internal means. 
Blacconière et al. found that U.S. electric utilities were more able to earn 
abnormal rents (or incur abnormal losses) following deregulation in 1992 (the 
U.S. Energy Act). As mentioned previously, under rate regulation, utility 
shareholders are virtually assured a rate of return on ‘stranded assets’.
16 In a 
deregulated environment, the eventual recovery of these costs depends more 
closely on future prices of energy, regulatory interventions (Blacconière et 
al., 2000, p. 238) and perhaps the toughness of competition policies. The 
main reason that is also their main conclusion is that earnings have become 
more important in the valuation of electric utilities (Blacconière et al., 2000, 
p. 234). Unlike a sample of capital intensive firms in manufacturing (used as  
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control group), the value of electric utilities’ earnings became more relevant 
than book value. They also found results consistent with utilities being valued 
differently than non-utilities prior to deregulation and more similarly to non-
utilities following deregulation (Blacconière et al., 2000, p. 247). 
Given the small number of papers about the influence of financial policy 
on R&D funding by European electric utilities, we find logical to draw on 
studies about the interdependencies of financial policy and R&D efforts 
outside the electricity industry. Initially, we briefly review recent empirical 
papers on R&D funding by small and large firms in manufacturing, before 
turning to the peculiarities of electric utilities with regards to financial 
constraint. Then we list the financial policy variables considered for our 
sample of electric utilities. 
 
R&D and financial policy in manufacturing. A way to consider the role of 
financial policy on R&D funding is through testing for the presence of 
liquidity constraints, or excess sensitivity to cash-flow shocks that are not 
signals of future demand increases. This literature has mainly looked at the 
cost implication of debt versus equity financing (Casson et al., 2008, p. 210). 
If a firm uses some of its additional cash for R&D, then it is said to be 
financially constrained in the sense that it must have had some unexploited 
investment opportunities that were not profitable using more costly external 
finance (Hall, 2002, pp. 41–43). Empirical evidence typically shows a 
positive association between R&D spending and cash flow, indicating a gap 
between the external and the internal costs of capital (Mahlich and Roediger-
Schluga, 2006, p 147). However debt is usually serviced from cash flow 
(debt requires a stable source of cash flow), which reduces the amount 
available to sustain a productive R&D programme. This literature also 
concludes however that the existence of financial constraints on innovation 
decreases with firm size, and depends on sectors. But the use of cash flow 
can be misleading. Mohnen et al. (2008) report a study where cash flow was 
not informative about the flow of R&D for panels of UK and German firms. 
There is also some agreement in the literature that cash flow sensitivity of 
investments need not identify liquidity constraints but rather is indicative of 
high demand and expectations of future profits (see Mohnen et al., 2008; 
Musso and Schiavo, 2007). As a consequence, we can’t be sure whether the 
absence of a significant relationship between R&D and cash flows is 
indicative of an absence of financial constraints. To overcome that problem 
we will insert real GDP per capita in our regression equations to isolate cash-
flow shocks that are not signals of future demand increases (see our 
paragraph on countries’ characteristics). 
The relationship between financial policy and R&D is also studied 
through the role of dividend policies in imperfect markets. In perfect 
financial markets R&D decisions should be independent of the firm’s 
financing decision. New debt is issued to finance R&D while new capital  
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issues raise funds from which R&D is undertaken too. The existence of a 
negative relationship between R&D expenditures and dividend paid is a 
standard result of the hypothesis of imperfect financial market. ‘Given that 
dividends and investment are alternative uses of funds, as dividends increase 
is an imperfect market one would expect investment to fall.’ (Guerard et al., 
1987, p. 1421). Guerard et al. find evidence of this as the effect of dividends 
on R&D is either non-significant or significantly negative in a sample of 
manufacturing firms in the U.S.A., which suggests that research is an 
alternative use of funds to paying dividends. 
It also turns out from this literature that R&D-intensive firms use a 
different financial policy to fund R&D projects. In a panel excluding utilities, 
Bah and Dumontier (2001, p. 675) suggest that non-R&D intensive firms 
(firms which exhibit an R&D-to-sales ratio lower than 5% in their paper) 
should exhibit a higher dividend payments and lower proportion of cash than 
R&D-intensive firms. R&D-intensive firms on the other hand prefer equity 
financing/short term debts and less dividend payments/more cash reserves to 
finance their R&D investments. For a panel of large and medium-sized firms 
in the U.K., Casson et al. (2008, pp. 215–7) find that ‘[f]irms with positive 
R&D tend to use more debt [(total debt as a share of total assets)] than firms 
with zero R&D, but among the R&D performing sub-sample the use of debt 
declines with R&D intensity.’ This is consistent with firms that report 
positive but low R&D use more debt finance than firms that report no R&D. 
Hall (2002, p. 40) also emphasises that large firms do prefer internal funds 
for financing investment in R&D while small and start-up R&D-intensive 
firms are either unable or reluctant to use debt finance for R&D investment. 
A general conclusion from this literature is that most R&D is funded 
internally as markets for financing R&D tend to be incomplete (investors 
outside the firm have difficulty distinguishing good projects from bad when 
the projects are long-term R&D investment. A corollary to that statement is 
that if firms have ready access to relatively cheap and long-term external 
funds, then R&D investment decisions is less dependent on internally 
generated cash flow (Mahlich and Roediger-Schluga, 2006, pp 152–3; Hall, 
2002, p. 38). Casson et al. (2008, p. 211) summarise the debt-equity tradeoffs 
by asserting that ‘Although firms may prefer internal funding … [they] are 
faced with fluctuations in profitability and have dividend policies with target 
dividend payout ratios, limiting the availability of funds for investment. In 
doing so, debt is the preferred form.’ 
Given the limited number of papers on the R&D-financial policy by 
electric utilities and since these latter have their own peculiarities, it is 
important to emphasise some of their characteristics that guided our choice of 
financial variables. 
 
The peculiarities of electric utilities in regard to financial constraint. Firstly, 
it is important to highlight the influence of regulation and deregulation. We  
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previously provided elements which suggest that financial policy may have 
changed following the deregulation of electricity markets. In this respect 
Dhrymes and Kurz (1964, p. 81) asserted how delicate is undertaking a 
statistical study of the financial policy of electric utilities, ‘… since there are 
many  semipolitical factors that enter into the decision making and since 
differences in the controlling power of local regulatory commissions may 
affect the financial policy of the firms.’ Rate regulation, which protects the 
firm against the risk of large losses, plays certainly a role but also denies 
above normal profits which could result from innovative activity (wilder and 
Stansell, 1974, p. 647). Above all, the essential role played by the electricity 
industry in the growth of nations is such that investments by electric utilities 
were largely oriented by governments’ energy policies, more particularly 
before the deregulation of electricity markets. Note as well a low 
‘investability’ (or openness to foreign equity investors) of many European 
electric utilities: state-controlled electric utilities like EdF (85% belongs to 
the French state) may not have the freedom to call on shareholders for more 
funds, which stretches their financial flexibility. 
The liberalisation of electricity markets has, as expected by electric 
utilities themselves (GAO, 1996), induced higher requirements on return on 
capital (WEC, 2007, p. 65). Markard et al. (2004), for example, conducted an 
empirical survey which revealed the minor role played by financial returns in 
electric utilities before markets liberalisation in Germany, The Netherlands 
and Switzerland. Since financial requirements are becoming high in the 
business of electric utilities, it has also been suggested (Bourgade, 2008, p. 2) 
that a favourable financial profile will stand as a valuable and competitive 
asset for some firms, in particular where the categorisation of certain 
liabilities is at stakes: ‘Moderately leveraged firms, with solid debt servicing 
ratios can better benefit from profitable growth opportunities than firms 
suffering from more aggressive financial profiles,…’. As electric utilities 
started being privatised and engaged in cross-boarder mergers with other 
utilities, the role of financial policy as a signal to investors became more 
crucial (see our previous discussion on the higher relevance of earnings in the 
valuation of electric utilities). Electric utilities would tend to resemble 
smaller, not established firms in manufacturing to which retained earnings in 
the R&D investment decision plays an important role, independent of their 
value as a signal of future profitability (Hall, 2002, p. 41). It is thus expected 
that positive cash flow (internal finance) play an increasing role for R&D 
than for ordinary investment. 
In addition to the differential effect of changes in market structure due to 
the reforms, the slow turnover of physical assets and the specificity of power 
plants should be another key factor behind the choice of financial policy by 
electric utilities. Indeed, the long-term is the timeframe that should be used to 
judge electric utilities more particularly in the nuclear sector (Hollinger, 
2009). Though R&D expenses can reduce short-term profitability, they are  
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viewed as a long-run investment, more particularly for upstream firms where 
the turnover time for current power generation infrastructure is slow 
(Margolis and Kammen, 1999). This long-run nature of investments is likely 
to favour debt financing of R&D projects. Bourgade (2008, p. 13) also 
concludes that the structure of liabilities is not a key determinant of firms 
market capitalisation, which reflects the long term nature of investment 
projects in the electric industry too. 
In addition to the stability or increases of cash flows, the composition of 
electric utilities’ assets should be a main factor influencing their financial 
structure. Hall (2002) reports that banks and debt-holders prefer to use 
physical assets to secure loans and are reluctant to lend when the project 
involves substantial R&D investment rather than investment in plant and 
equipment. On the other hand, assets that are not very redeployable are less 
suited to the governance structures associated with debt (asset specificity à la 
O. Williamson). Electric utilities are a case in point; they invest in large, 
capital-intensive production plants that have very few alternative uses (see 
Jolink and Niesten, 2008). But, non-redeployment is precisely a characteristic 
of R&D-intensive firms who invest in highly specialised researches. Electric 
utilities are not R&D-intensive, however as we already showed. These 
seemingly contradictory results suggest that electric utilities’ financial policy 
could be similar to that of both R&D-intensive firms and non R&D-intensive 
firms (e.g. in manufacturing) in particular as regards indebtedness. Our 
opinion is that as most electric utilities are still regional or national 
incumbents, clearly protected against bankruptcy, they enjoy a particular 
situation which enables them to carry a high proportion of liabilities. 
We shall now list the variables we considered to control for the influence 
of financial policy on R&D funding by electric utilities. As in Bah and 
Dumontier (2001) we name these variables by using the Thomson Financial’s 
Worldscope numerical classification. This will help comparison with future 
research on the role of corporate financial policy on electric utilities’ R&D 
funding. We also use some abbreviations used in the financial economics 
literature. 
 
Electric utilities’ financial variables. To measure indebtedness we use long 
term debts (3251). Regarding profitability, we follow Bah and Dumontier 
(2001) and Wilder and Stansell (1974) who use returns on equity that is 
earnings before extraordinary items (1551) divided by total equity (3501), a 
ratio known as ROE. Note that Sanyal (2007) uses the so called EBITDA 
divided by total assets. We use one measure of dividend policy, namely the 
total common and preferred dividends paid to shareholders of the company 
(4551). Finally, for our measure of budget constraints we use one measure of 
the level of cash at the disposal of the firm (2001). If the coefficient 
multiplying the cash flow variable is not significantly different from zero 
then firms are not subject to any external financial constraint whilst if it is  
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significantly positive, the firm faces some contraint (see Mahlich and 




We follow Sanyal (2007) and use country level data to capture market 
structure changes due to restructuring and the pace of deregulation. Besides, 
as a corporate may be located in or have its main activities in a geographical 
area which may be more or less conducive of innovation, we control for the 
possible contributions of upstream suppliers’ innovation and the general 
influence on R&D decisions of national propensities to innovate. 
Furthermore, we control for the mix in generation capacities held by electric 
utilities. We motivate the choice of these three factors in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
Deregulation and competition 
As suggested in the literature, institutional changes (deregulation, full market 
liberalisation) are of importance on R&D efforts, more particularly as regards 
electricity generation where competition often is greatest. Since a fraction of 
R&D is connected to generation activity, the divesture of generation assets 
that generally follows market deregulation should have a negative impact on 
R&D. As suggested by Jolink and Niesten (2008), ‘The unbundling and the 
introduction of competition into the industry have increased the importance 
of the dedicated investments [henceforth R&D] and uncertainty for the 
electricity generators as they have lost their relatively stable customer base’. 
For example, vertical integration provided a safeguard for the generators 
against opportunism by the network operators. The link between upward 
competition and technology development was emphasised even earlier by the 
International Energy Agency (Sheer, 1996, p. 9). According to the Agency, 
 
As generators are unsure of which customers they will be servicing at the 
expiration of short-term generation contracts, there is little or no incentive for them 
to engage in R&D efforts which aim to reduce the cost or raise the efficiency of 
generating technologies over the long-term, even where there would be clear … 
benefits for society. 
 
It would be interesting to use some annual values of a concentration variable 
at the firm level. Unfortunately, generation data at the firm level is not 
available over the whole period covered in the present analysis. More 
important, such a variable is not appropriate because electric utilities were 
not competing for market shares abroad before market liberalisation which 
occurred at different dates across countries. Differences in the configuration 
of the electricity industry at the time of market liberalisation across countries  
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could also be of importance. As an example, in England, as more firms 
started competing at the time where regions opened up to entry of firms from 
foreign regions and foreign countries, potential competition was subsequently 
higher. But for a similar reason than that just given, changes in the number of 
players is available and only partially since the deregulation of electricity 
markets. A further interesting variable is the toughness of price regulation 
over time. We have only found that variable for European electric utilities for 
the year 2005, however. In the case where a more complete variable would 
be available, it would be necessary to isolate an unregulated control group in 
the industry to see the particular effect of price regulation. But, all our firms 
were subject to rate or revenue regulation for most of the years spanned by 
our data. This problem is similar to that in wilder and Stansell (1974) whose 
sample included more than 90% of regulated firms thus could not find a net 
effect of regulation on R&D outlays. 
For these reasons, we capture the effect on R&D of deregulation and 
competition through a variable that takes a value equal to 1 since the year of 
the first piece of legislation, and a variable that measures the number of years 
since countries fully opened their retail markets to competition. The choice of 
the former variable is motivated by the work of Sanyal (2007) who found that 
passing an order for retail competition has more effect on environmental 
research than implementing legislation for retail access. That variable also 
captures the change from regulated to deregulated utilities. It is an appealing 
candidate to capture the trend reversion that we observed in R&D. 
Nonetheless, it is important to allow for a differential effect of deregulation 
and competition, which motivates our choice of a potential ‘retail 
competition effect’. We do not use the same variable than in Sanyal (2007) 
who classifies U.S. states according to the stage of deregulation they reached 
in 1996 (the year that showed wide spread deregulation activity). We assume 
that that variable, the value of which can vary across firms but is constant 
over time for each firm, should capture similar influence than the variables 
used in Sanyal (2007), however: we expect the later the year of retail market 
opening, the lower should be the decrease in R&D. 
 
Technological opportunities 
In addition to our previous variables, we include a variable of technological 
opportunities to control for differences between firms with respect to their 
propensity to patent the results of inventive activity (we borrow this idea 
from Johnstone et al., 2008; see p. 5 of their paper). The rationale behind this 
assertion can also be found in details in Nelson and Wolf (1997, p. 207) who 
assert that the richer the technological opportunities, the more R&D it is 
profitable for firms to fund (efforts in R&D are more productive). We follow 
Johnstone et al. (2008) who capture differences in both scientific capacity  
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and the propensity to patent across countries and time through the use of 
patent applications to the European Patent Office by priority year at the 
national level divided by nominal gross domestic product. This variable is 
influenced by national innovation policies and cultural factors. It may also 
capture differences in environmental regulation due to difference in 
environmental policy instruments which unfortunately are not available over 
the entire period covered by our data set. This variable is also a rough 
measure for the contributions of upstream suppliers’ innovation which is 
made by equipment and research equipment suppliers from industries outside 
electricity (chemistry, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, physics …).  
Technological opportunities should be positively related to R&D efforts, 
for at least two reasons. It is expected that a firm in a country with a 
persistent higher level of technological opportunities than that in other 
countries, will benefit from higher R&D spillovers. Second, as this variable 
takes values that also change over time, in countries with increasing 
technological opportunities, R&D at the level of firms should increase too. 
Obviously as Nelson and Wolf (1997, p. 213) point out, R&D done upstream 
can pre-empt or be a substitute for R&D in the electricity industry (the more 
of the work that is done upstream, the less is done in-house), thus 




The consideration of the fuel mix in each country is motivated by the work of 
Sanyal (2007) who finds a positive influence of a ‘coal heavy state dummy’ 
on environmental R&D spending. This is supported by the study of Markard 
et al. (2004) at the firm level that shows evidence that in case of green power, 
existing resources and assets like hydro power plants ‘... represented a strong 
incentive to launch a green power product whereas a long tradition in nuclear 
or fossil fuel based power generation rather represented a barrier.’ It is 
therefore likely that in firms like EdF, which produces electricity essentially 
from nuclear and hydro plants, these variables will have opposite effects on 
R&D. We can’t use the share of coal at the firm level, due to data limitation. 
We use a time-varying variable that is available at the country level from the 
International Energy Agency, namely the share of conventional net thermal 
generation (electricity generated from oil, coal and gas) of country   in year 
 divided by net generation in that year from hydro and renewable resources 




Demand side factor 
We finally consider proxies for growth opportunities. P. Sanyal uses gross 
state product to see if richer states conduct more environmental research, 




actions is greater in richer areas than poorer ones and this translates into 
differential environmental strategies adopted by [electric utilities]…’ (Sanyal, 
2007, p. 349). Our variable is gross domestic product (GDP hereafter), at 
market price per capita. We thus expect that that variable will have a positive 
effect on R&D. 
Currencies from countries outside the European Monetary Union were 
converted to euro. R&D, Size, GDP and other monetary variables are 
measured in real term by using the GDP deflator. The data on national patent 
applications to the European Patent Office by priority year are from the 
Eurostat webstite. The variable of patent applications at the level of the firm 
were collected from the European Patent Office’s Espace Access data base. 
Finally, information on M&A operations are from Lévêque and Monturus 
(2008). We checked and completed them by using other online-resources. 
 
 
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
The Model Specification 
 
Unlike Cohen and Klepper (1996) we estimate the multiplicative form of 
marginal returns to R&D schedule, which will invole taking the logarithm of 
the variables: 
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We take the Napier logarithm of Eq. 3, which gives: 
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where  . Throughout productivity  1 lng ββ ≡ , it s N  is approximated by 
corporate past growth rate: 
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where unlike t ,   is fixed. Since accounting data are available later than 
1980 for some firms, we start with a value for s  such that 
. Note that unlike Cohen and Klepper (1996), we 
consider neither technological opportunities nor R&D productivity as fixed 
parameters.
18 Therefore there is no reason why the coefficients multiplying 
these variable should take the same value in the population. Besides, they 
must be sensitive to the proxy we choose for measuring technological 
opportunities ( ) and the proxy for productivity (
s
min{1990, : 0} ict st Q =>
ct O , it s N ).We thus relax the  
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constrain on the  β s in (4) and offer a more general specification including 
firm-effects and our control variables stacked in the vector  :  ict x
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where   if  1 ij d = j i =  and   otherwise,  0 , it s r −  is the average exponential 
growth rate of sales for firm   and period [,  (when this rate is small,  i ] st







As in many of the empirical studies of the R&D-firm size relationship, we 
employ data at the corporate level. Unlike Cohen and Klepper (1996 p. 937), 
it is thus impossible to test for the effect of corporate size on business unit 
R&D and therefore the ‘strong’ from of the CSA hypothesis can not be tested 
(see Cohen and Klepper, 1996, p. 936). However, when aggregated across 
firms the existence of a proportional R&D-firm size relationship at the level 
of business units must produce a close relationship between corporate R&D 
and corporate sales. The analysis of the CSA hypothesis at the business unit 
for electric utilities is left for future research.
19 Our main hypothesis (the 
‘weak’ from of the CSA) is 
1
02 : H β 1 ≤ , against  . If the null is 
rejected, or the estimate of 
1
12 : H β >1
2 β  is greater than one, this will lead to 
acceptance of the Schumpeterian hypothesis and rejection of the threshold 
side hypothesis. 
As in Sanyal (2007) our objective is to estimate a random effect model 
which would be an appropriate way of proceeding here as our sample in hand 
may not be sufficiently representative of the underlying population. Our 
sample is indeed drawn from of a larger population that includes more than 
two hundred firms including multiutilities which have significant activities in 
electricity, and we did not considered separately the affiliates from our firms. 
There are three other crucial issues we have to address before we start to 
provide estimates for the coefficient of the variables supposed to determine 
R&D. One is related to the poolability of the data, the second is the 
endogeneity of size over our sample period, and the third is sample selection. 
 
Poolability 
We use the Roy-Zellner version of the test for poolability. Given that the 
number of variables of our model approaches that of firms we restricted the 
model by excluding the control variables ( ict ) to avoid collinearity between 
a subset of the regressors. The model is estimated with random-firm effects 





It includes our three explanatory variables plus their interaction with firm 
dummies. The model estimation is not very satisfying due to the collinearity 
problem which forces us to drop some interaction variables. The test statistic 
is equal to 194.25 that is distributed as a  which leads to 
rejection of the null of poolability. 
2(32) 46.19 χ =
The first column in Table 2 reports results for the basic model. From this 
model, the Student statistics associated wi 1  
1
02 : ≤  is 0.639 that is 
lower than the 5 or 10% critical value thus we reject the hypothesis from this 
model. As we shall show, this model specification is too simple and omits 
several of the key variables introduced in the previous section. 
 
Table 2:  The basic model 
  Model 1    Model 2   
Size 1.064  ***  1.159  *** 
 (.100)    (.095)   
Productivity –4.471  ***  –2.412  *** 
 (1.536)    (0.537)   
Tech. Opportunity  0.073  *  0.126  *** 
  (0.042)    (0.044)   
Constant –7.523  ***  –9.931  *** 
 (1.885)    (1.684)   
No. observations  104    59   
2 R  overall  0.69    0.73   
 
Note: The models have firm-random effects. The coefficients are estimated by GLS. Standard 
errors are robust. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.* 
Model 1 assumes  in the formula for  1990 s = , it s N −  whilst  1998 s =  in Model 2. 
 
Endogeneity 
As we already emphasised firm’s size is more likely to respond to domestic 
electricity demand, due to obligation of services. Therefore, size is likely to 
be exogenous. As emphasised by Cohen and Klepper (1996, footnote 26, p. 
939) however, ‘R&D is expected to affect growth with a considerable lag due 
to the time it takes to generate, develop and commercialise innovations’. But, 
our sample period covers 28 years, which is exactly the situation in which we 
should care about a possible effect of R&D on Size, an issue not addressed in 
Sanyal and Cohen (2008) and Sanyal (2007). 
Cohen and Klepper (1996) suggested an indirect test of this endogeneity 
bias, which consists in checking if different values for   in  s , it s N  affect 
significantly the result of the overall model estimation. We thus test for the 
possibility that R&D determines firm’s size by varying   in  s , it s N . We 
compare the previous result with  min{1998, : 0} ict st Q = > . The model is 
reported in the second column of Table 2. The coefficients seem to change 




Table 3: Full model 
  Model 3    Model 4    Model 5   
Size 1.538  ***  2.083  ***  2.249  *** 
 (0.508)    (0.324)    (0.210)   
Productivity 2.324  *  0.876    0.132   
 (1.372)    (1.107)    (0.764)   
Tech. Opportunity  0.093           
  (0.149)           
Distribution Network  dropped           
            
M&A 0.825           
 (0.068)           
Debt –0.525  ***  –0.715  ***  –0.765  *** 
  (0.174)    (0.130)    (0.117)   
Cash 0.119           
 (0.132)           
Profitability (ROE)  –0.114           
 (0.299)           
Dividend –6.35×10




–7)   (1.16×10
–7) (1.08×10
–7) 
Electricity Act  –0.569  **  –0.211    –0.337  ** 
  (0.279)    (0.191)    (0.169)   
Retail liberalisation  dropped   
   
   
             
Fuel Mix  0.120  ***  0.078  ***  0.058  *** 
  (0.032)    (0.021)    (0.017)   
GDP 1.586           
 (1.098)           
Constant –26.178  ***  –15.720    –17.478  *** 
 (11.169)    (4.690)    (2.827)   
Inverse Mills Ratio      1.809  ***  1.895  *** 
     (0.317)    (0.283)   
No. observations  108    126    292   
R
2  overall  0.28    0.55       
 
Note:. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. ‘Model 3’ 
has fixed-firm effects. The coefficients are estimated by OLS. A test for the equality of the fixed 
effects produces a f-statistics of 5.11 that is greater than the tabulated value (≅1.8). ‘Model 4’ has 
fixed-firm effects corrected from sample selection. The hypothesis for the equality of the fixed 
effects is also rejected in this model. ‘Model 5’ is a tobit with left-censoring at zero. To scale the 
results, the model includes a dummy that is equal to one for each observation associated with a 
zero R&D value. 
 
Note that the number of observations is reduced dramatically due to the 
restriction imposed on the productivity variable. Besides, the sub-period from 
which we estimate the model corresponds to the deregulation of the 
electricity industry in several countries, with an average of 5 years per firm. 
The coefficient estimates are thus less subject to the trend reversion in R&D. 
From this model, the Student statistics associated with 
1
02 : H β 1 ≤  is 1.670 
that is nearly equal to the 5% critical value (1.67) and greater than the 10%  
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critical value of 1.9. We thus reject the hypothesis of an advantage of small 
firms in R&D in favour of the Schumpeterian hypothesis. We also ran the 
classical Hausman procedure to test for exogeneity of the size variable in the 
panel from the results of a model with firm-fixed effects. 
Since endogeneity was detected with the previous procedure, we decide to 
include all the variables presented in the previous section as this omission 
may be the source of the endogeneity problem. To have a larger sample size 
as possible, for each firm we use  min{1980, : 0} ict st Q = > . The test statistic 
is equal to 52.40 that is distributed as a  which leads to 
rejection of the null hypothesis and also to adoption of the model with firm-
fixed effects. The results for the estimated coefficients of this model are 
reported in the first column of Table 3. The coefficient on ‘Productivity’ is 
more consistent with the predictions of the CSA model and results found 
elsewhere in the literature: ‘… the larger the past growth rate of the firm … 
then the greater the future output of the firm over which it can apply its R&D, 
thereby providing it with a greater incentive to conduct R&D’ (Cohen and 
Klepper, 1996, footnote 35, p. 942). Although the estimated coefficient on 
the size variable takes a larger value than in the previous model, its precision 
has reduced. The problem here is that of sample size bias. 
2(10) 18.31 χ =
Before interpreting the results we must try to overcome the loss of degrees 
of freedom due to the large number of reported zero R&D values. A quick-
and-easy way would be to estimate a Tobit model with left censoring. In fact, 
in our case, with nearly 68% missing empty R&D observations, the Tobit is 




Sanyal (2007) uses a random effect Tobit specification with the lower bound 
at zero since she did not find evidence of selection. Sanyal and Cohen (2008) 
find evidence of selection, however.
20 The rationale for sample selection is 
justified as follows. Our R&D (dependent) variable contains a considerable 
amount of zeros, however. For example Union Fenosa, does not report R&D 
at all. It is difficult to know whether no reporting of R&D is a randomly 
missing process or an endogenous decision (see Bound et al., 1984, pp. 22–
25): ‘An important issue is whether the fact that [some] firms do not report 
R&D expenditure will bias results based only on firms which do.’ Sanyal and 
Cohen (2008) and Sanyal (2007) formulated the problem of sample selection 
as one where electric utilities’ investment in R&D is a two-step process. 
First, electric utility i  decides whether it invests in R&D or not in year  , a 
decision which depends on the firm’s expected future benefits from R&D. If 





wants to spend (the structure of the formal econometric model can be found 
in Sanyal and Cohen, 2008).  
This approach is consistent with the condition that the profit maximising 
level must be non-negative (see Eq. (2)), which en passant suggests that the 
firm’s profit can be considered as a selection variable. It turns out that this 
description relies on accounting practices in the U.S.A where firms must 
expense R&D as it is incurred (capitalization is not allowed in the USA with 
a few exceptions; see Oswald et Zarowin, 2007) whereas in Europe, 
companies have more discretion regarding the possibility to capitalise their 
R&D expenses. We must therefore admit that as some if not all of our firms 
have the choice to expense or capitalise their R&D efforts, the factors behind 
missing R&D expenditures are less obvious to understand.  
We estimated a pooled regression model on the whole data. Our choice of 
variable is crucial but limited by the small number of firms in our sample and 
the overrepresented amount of zeros for R&D for most of them. We selected 
the following variables: firm size, intangible assets (intangible assets include 
capitalised R&D) divided by size, profitability, indebtedness divided by size, 
deregulation (see the ‘DATA’ section for their definition). As in Sanyal and 
Cohen (2008) we find that the size of electric utilities matters in the decision 
to report R&D, or bigger firms are more likely to engage in R&D than 
smaller firms. Apart from profitability and capitalisation, all variables are 
significant at the 5% level. The estimate of the coefficient multiplying debts 
has a negative sign which suggests that electric utilities may decide or not to 
report R&D to have some control over their indebtedness. 
The next step consists in re-estimating the equation for R&D in level and 
correcting for sample selection. We estimate that model after removing the 
variables that were non significant in ‘Model 3’. The results are reported in 
the second column of Table 3 (‘Model 4’). 
 
Further results 
We interpret the results from ‘Model 5’ which by considering the entire set of 
observations seem to produce more precise results. The coefficient on the 
firm size variable is largely in favour of the Schumpeterian hypothesis. The 
Student statistics associated with 
1
02 : H β ≤  is equal to 5.937 that is largely 
above the critical value. We thus reject the hypothesis of proportionality and 
of an advantage of small firms in R&D in favour of the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis. We also estimated the tobit model with sales net of R&D rather 
than assets as the size variable to avoid the critic point out in Hall et al. 
(2007) that there is a simple accounting correlation between size and R&D. 
This correlation should imply a one for one relationship between R&D and 
size. With sales net of R&D we still find a significantly positive coefficient 
that is not statistically different to 1 at the 5% level (0.917). But since its  
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value is lower to unity we must reject a higher than proportional relationship 
between R&D and net sales whereas we accept with assets as the size 
variable. The bottom line is that proportionality characterises electric utilities, 
which lends credence to Cohen and Klepper’s CSA hypothesis for electric 
utilities. 
The financial variables (debt and dividends) are negatively related to 
R&D. This result for the former variable supports the behaviour of electric 
utilities during the past ten years by which they spent considerable funds to 
make domestic and cross-boarder M&A operations. An increase of 100,000 
euros in dividends is associated with a 4.1 percentage points decrease in 
R&D. Thought the M&A variable itself was not significant throughout the 
regressions, indebtedness was. The result for dividends in more politically 
sensible as it would suggest that research is an alternative use of funds to 
paying dividends, or the higher the money paid to investors, notably private 
investors, the lower is the amount spend in R&D. The non-significance of the 
cash variable in all our regressions would suggest that electric utilities are not 
financially constrained. As we mentioned earlier, cash flow sensitivity of 
R&D investment needs not identify liquidity constraints but rather is 
indicative of high demand and expectations of future profits. We controlled 
for that by considering a measure of domestic wealth at the country level, 
namely GDP. Perhaps that a more precise measure of the demand addressed 
to the electric utilities would lead to a different result, which is left for a 
future version of the present paper. 
The coefficient on the effect of deregulation is still negative and 
significant. As the variable is a dummy and R&D is measured in logarithm, 
we deduce the percentage impact of the deregulation variable on R&D from 
the formula given for example in Sanyal and Cohen (2008, footnote 44). We 
find a negative impact of 135% which is considerable but fully consistent 
with the figures of decrease in R&D hence R&D intensity for some firms. 
The variable of fuel mix that is the ratio of thermal to renewable electricity 
generation also has the expected sign: firms in countries with a relatively 
higher share of clean energy needs less to spend in R&D. To put it 
differently, our result suggests that firms that produce electricity from energy 
resources that are detrimental to the environment are also those that spend 





The present paper aims to provide a better understanding of the effect of 
reforms on R&D by electric utilities. Following previous works done for U.S. 
electric utilities, we expect that it will contribute to the formulation of more  
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effective energy R&D policies, a claim made for by Jamasb and Pollitt very 
recently. Our results have some implication regarding the consequence on 
innovation of merger policies. The most obvious is that by preventing 
consolidation of the larger firms, competition commissions may impede 
increases in total industry R&D efforts. 
While special attention was given to firm size, the present paper provided 
insights into a larger number of factors behind innovation input. Overall, 
these results also suggest that the management of activities associated with 
discovering new knowledge and applying it to new products is likely to be 
different in the electricity sector to other industries. The main reason is that 
electric utilities are subject to specific regulations and obligations. As we 
have shown, these peculiarities are such that electric utilities were and still 
seem not subject to financial constraint. But, it turns out that the entry of new 
investors, following the privatisation of electric utilities, are creating some 
competition for funds, notably at the expense of R&D. 
Further analyses are left for future researches. First of all, it would be 
interesting to increase the number of firms so as to be able to estimate less 
misspecified models and consider more variables, notably, to have a clearer 
control on the influence of the decision by firms not to report R&D. 
Regarding other measures of innovation, a complementary research would be 
to see whether large electric utilities generate more or less innovations per 
euro of R&D. As this research contributes to the more general question of 
what is the profile of electric utilities that are more likely to spend in research 
and development, and since these firms are necessarily those more likely to 
‘survive’ in an environment under competitive pressures, an deep analysis of 
the determinants of M&A operations would be very valuable too. 
As suggested in Hall (2002), there can also be an important role for policy 
based on the existence of significant spillovers and externalities, rather than 
on the financing-gap argument, in particular for large established firms. The 
electricity industry is a case in point. This is perhaps more important an 
argument than those based on the existence of financial constraints which are 
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assistance from Jean-Marie l’Allemain and more particularly Benoît Bourné is greatly 
acknowledged too. The usual disclaimer remains. 
2.  This issue is becoming of practical interest to competition commissioners who should base 
their decision to cancel or not a merger on the basis of the consequences a more concentrated 
liberalised market would have on the propensity of the candidates to the merger to innovate. 
3.  To fully understand this argument, it is worth noticing wholesale markets deregulation is 
always followed by a progressive opening up of retail markets to competition. 
4.  Margolis and Kammen (1999) yet noticed the little work done on return on investment s in 
R&D in the energy sector. A possible reason of the lack of such analyses could be that the 
capital structure of electric utilities still remains, to a significant extent, in the hands of 
regulators and administration, although this dependence varies across countries and over 
time, depending on the degree of market liberalisation, firms’ privatisation and divesture. 
This introduces some heterogeneity which can’t simply be controlled for by including firm or 
industry effects. As a consequence, the behaviour of electric utilities and utilities in general, 
is analysed in papers specific to this category of firms. 
5.  A private discussion with an employee involved in R&D activities at Electricité de France 
(the firm is floated since November 2005) revealed that R&D expenditures aimed to increase 
energy saving by consumers is more strategic than ever before. 
6.  Obviously, some innovation is more specific to a type of power plant. As an example, 
operating costs in nuclear energy are directly related to incidents, the occurrence of which 
can be reduced from organisational (process) innovations which can give to the firm a 
competitive advantage (see Roux-Dufort and Metais, 1999 who address this issue in the case 
of the nuclear power producer, Electricité de France; the firm changed its way of managing 
nuclear risks by introducing in 1982 an organisational innovation known as the ‘Human 
Factor’ policy). 
7.  Baumol (2002, p. 154) defines product innovation as one innovation that shifts the demand 
curve for the affected final product to the right, while a process innovation shifts the 
pertinent cost curves downward. If successful, process innovation can expand output and 
reduce product price. If, at the converse, marginal cost rises, this is accepted in returns for a 
large cut in fixed costs. The distinction between product and process innovation is not clear 
in the field of environmental researches, however ‘… because significant improvements of 
environmental conditions may be attained by both types of innovations.’ (Horbach, 2008, p. 
169). 
8.  This is a consequence of the second condition of the CSA, that at any given moment, electric 
utilities are not expected to grow rapidly due to innovation. Furthermore, R&D expenditures 
are usually budgeted several months before they are spent (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, pp. 
926, 937) 
9.  Unlike Wilder and Sansell (1974) we do not have the ratio of electric to total operating 
revenue for all years of our sample of observation. 
10. See Jamasb and Pollitt (2008, 2009), Johnstone et al. (2008), Sanyal and Cohen (2008) and 
Sanyal (2007) for more details on innovation by electric utilities. 
11  A more documented definition can be found in Datastream. Note that it excludes government 
sponsored research, contributions by government, customers, partnerships or other 
corporations to the company's research and development expense. 
12. In 2008 it spent about one fourth of its R&D budget to environmental projects (EdF, 2008, p. 
185). 
13.  Defeuilley and Furtado (2000) report a change from £201 millions in 1998 to £40–50 
millions in the 1990s of researches aimed at nuclear energy. 
14.  There are studies with less gross measures of R&D. As an example Sanyal (2007) uses 
environmental R&D whereas Sanyal and Cohen (2008) use total R&D expenditures that 
include all internal and external R&D expenditures by the utility. Within internal there is 
expenditure of generation, transmission, distribution and environmental projects. The 
external R&D is contributions to the research institutes. I thank Paoma Sanyal for pointing 
out this distinction to me. 
15. A pooled regression of total assets on sales and a constant leads to a 
2 R  equal to 0.98; the 
coefficient which multiplies the constant is not significantly different from zero at the 1%  
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level of significance whereas the coefficient multiplying sales equals 1.71 with a standard 
error of 0.041. 
16. Relatively high-cost generating facilities, and more generally costs that are not expected to be 
recovered in a competitive wholesale power market (Blacconière et al., 2000). 
17  Upstream firms traditionally used to undertake research projects in collaboration with electric 
utilities as evidenced e.g. through the EdF/Areva and E.ON/Alstom/Siemens established 
partnerships. In the case of electricity industrial policies prompt cooperative research which 
allows electric utilities and equipment builders to share the cost of some R&D project, e.g. 
the joint EDF-Areva project for construction of a pressurised water reactor, the EPR. 
18. In their paper,  ct O  is constant and as such it enters the intercept. Regarding productivity it is 
calculated once for all in their paper as they transformed their panel data to a cross-section by 
averaging over their annual observations. This specification allows marginal returns to R&D 
to vary across firms according to the value of  β  provided we assume that that parameter 
varies across firms (Cohen and Klepper, 1996 allow that parameter to vary across industries). 
We keep that parameter constant and consider Ο  and  N  as alternative factors likely to 
influence the R&D-size relationship. 
19. This would be possible by analysing corporate web sites which are available at most for the 
last two to five years for most firms. 
20. In a private discussion the author gave as justification that since in her 2007’s paper R&D is 
just environmental, the selection equation there was whether the firm first decides whether to 
conduct environmental R&D or not, thus suggesting that the larger selection decision would 
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